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ABSTRACT
A simple model is proposed to account for reactive effects due to retro-
spective thought measurements on subsequent measures of ccgnitive structure in
an advertising context. Some of the predictions derived from the model are
then tested in a laboratory experiment on advertising effectiveness. The find-
ings are consistent with the model predictions, and suggest that thought
measurement inflates subsequent measures of brand name recall, and confidence
in and strength of association among belief, attitude, and intention measures-
and particularly so when audiences adopt a brand evaluation (rather than an ad
evaluation) goal during the initial ad-viewing episode. Implications of these
findings for future persuasion research utilizing the thought measurement
methodology are discussed.
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Over the last decade or so, persuasion researchers have become increasingly
interested in the cognitive processes that presumably mediate communication
effects on cognitive structure variables. This interest is evidenced by the
current popularity of the cognitive response approach which specifies that the
spontaneous thoughts or cognitive responses experienced during message exposure
are the key mediators of message effects on beliefs and attitudes about the
message topic (Greenwald 1968; Wright 1973, 1980; Olson, Toy and Dover 1978,
1982; Petty, Ostrom and Brock 1981; Lutz and Swasy 1977). Cognitive responses
are usually measured by asking subjects to verbalize or write down the thoughts
they had as they viewed the persuasive message. These thought verbalization
data have been used to test increasingly detai Led theories and hypotheses
about mass persuasion phenomena such as low involvement advertising effects
(Petty and Cacioppo 1981, 1984; Petty, Cacioppo and Schuman 1983; Batra and
Ray 1983; Gardner, Mitchell and Russo 1982; Chaiken 1980), mediators of source
versus message characteristics on attitude (Petty and Cacioppo 1981, 1984;
Petty, Cacioppo and Schuman 1983; Sternthal, Dholakia and Leavitt 1978),
effects of distraction on yielding (Petty, Wells, and Brock 1976), and medi-
ators of attitude towards the advertisement (MacKenzie and Lutz 1982; Lutz,
MacKenzie and Belch 1983; Batra and Ray 1983; Mitchell, Russo, and Gardner
1985). This incomplete list of applications illustrates the great interest in
thought verbalization data among persuasion and advertising researchers.
Given the increasing use of verbal reports as data in persuasion research,
it is important to establish that the procedures used to elicit these verbal
reports are non-reactive, i.e., they do not influence subsequent measures of
brand-related cognitive structure such as recall of brand name and ad content
and/or beliefs, attitudes, and intentions about the advertised brand. If the
act of thought listing/verbalization influences one or more of these persuasion-
related dependent variables, then the validity of tests for experimental effects
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on those variables has clearly been compromised. Despite the importance of
this "reactivity" issue, relatively few studies in the social psychology
literature (and none in marketing) have examined the effects of taking thought
measurements on subsequent measures of cognitive structure about the advocacy
issue (Petty and Cacioppo 1977; Insko, Turnbull and Yandell 1974: Petty, Wells
and Brock 1976). Even in these studies, the approach was essentially atheo-
retical. No reasons for expecting reactive effects due to the thought listing/
verbalization task were offered, and nor was any attempt made to identify the
mechanisms or processes that might mediate such effects. Instead, thought
measurement was manipulated as a between subjects factor (i.e., some subjects
listed their thoughts before they reported their attitude, while others did
not) , and all possible (main and interactive) effects due to thought measure-
ment on post-exposure attitude were assessed. In all three studies, thought
measurement failed to influence subsequent measures of attitude. These results
are frequently cited as evidence that the thought listing/verbalization proce-
dures are non-reactive (Cacioppo, Harkins and Petty 1981; Cacioppo and Petty
1981). However, the absence of a theoretical framework limits the generaliz-
ability of these findings to other dependent variables, stimuli, and settings.
In particular, several questions remain unresolved. For instance, does the
failure to find significant effects on attitude mean that other indicators of
cognitive structure such as beliefs and intentions or recall of brand name and
ad content will also not be affected by thought measurement? Will the reactive
effects due to thought measurement change if the persuasive message is a novel
advertisement about an unfamiliar brand rather than the more typical "listing
of arguments" in favor of a counterat titudinal issue used in social psychology
studies? Will situational factors such as processing goals or individual dif-
ference variables such as involvement and product familiarity moderate the
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magnitude of reactive effects due to thought measurement? Clearly, these ques-
tions cannot be answered on the basis of post-hoc empirical analyses alone.
In this paper, we examine the effects of thought measurement on subsequent
measures of several cognitive structure variables of interest to persuasion
researchers. First, we introduce a simple theoretical framework that (a) spe-
cifies the cognitive structure variables that are likely to be affected by
thought measurement, (b) identifies the mechanisms or processes that mediate
these effects, and (c) predicts the conditions under ;-.Thich these reactive
effects are likely to be large. Hypotheses generated from the framework are
then tested using data from an experiment. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of the results and their implications for future persuasion research
using verbal reports as data.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In most persuasion research, thought measurements are obtained by the
method of retrospective thought listing or verbalization. The procedures used
to obtain retrospective verbal reports have become fairly standardized (e.g.,
Olson, Toy and Dover 1982). Immediately after exposure to a persuasive message
(e.g., an advertisement), subjects are asked to verbally state or write down
all the thoughts that occurred to them as they viewed the message/advertisement,
Subjects are given a fixed period of time (usually 2-4 minutes) for thought
listing. Measures of persuasive impact (such as beliefs and attitudes) and
memorability (such as recall/recognition) are then usually obtained.
Cognitive response theory holds that the recipient of an advertisement
generates spontaneous cognitive responses or thoughts as he/she attempts to
comprehend and evaluate the advertising message. The type of cognitive re-
sponses generated depend on the goals of the receiver. For the moment, we
assume that the receiver is interested in forming an evaluation of the
—u—
advertised brand. This assumption is relaxed in a subsequent section when we
examine the effects of processing goals on the reactivity of thought measure-
ment. If a brand evaluation goal is adopted, the receiver will predominantly
produce counter and support arguments, i.e., pro/con thoughts directed at the
advertised brand or at specific assertions/claims about the brand made in the
advertisement. These cognitive responses are presumed to be the causal deter-
minants of post-exposure beliefs, attitudes, and intentions about the adver-
tised brand (Wright 1973, 1980; Olson, Toy, and Dover 1982). Thus, the cogni-
tive responses are likely stored in long term memory in close proximity to the
brand name and some of the advertising claims that triggered these responses,
as well as the newly formed (or changed) beliefs, attitudes, and intentions
about the brand (Wright 1980; Mitchell 1983; Beattie and Mitchell 1985).
When confronted with an unexpected thought reporting task, subjects attempt
to retrieve their cognitive responses from memory. Some of these cognitive
responses are still available in STM and can be readily reported. However, a
majority of the cognitive responses are unavailable in STM, and must be
searched for and retrieved from LTM (Ericsson and Simon 1980; Wright 1980).
Retrieval of information from LTM is best explained by the spreading activa-
tion theory of semantic processing (Collins and Loftus 1975). As the subject
attempts to retrieve his cognitive responses, one or more cognitive response
nodes in memory are initially activated. Activation then spreads to other
neighboring concept nodes, i.e., to other cognitive responses as well as some
of the beliefs, attitudes/intentions, and message assertions that are stored
in memory in close proximity to the cognitive responses. Note that this
spread of activation in the LTM associative network is at least partly auto-
matic and outside the conscious control of the subject (Collins and Loftus
1975; Anderson 1980). In other words, even though the subjects may be concen-
trating their attention on the task of retrieving and reporting their prior
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cognitive responses, some of the other brand-related concepts that are linked
to these cognitive responses will be activated. The activated concepts enter
STM and are available for thought/listing verbalization. Subjects must exam-
ine these activated concepts and identify those concepts that reflect their
prior thoughts before producing a verbal or written report of their thoughts.
In sum, we have conceptualized the retrospective thought listing/verbaliza-
tion task as a two stage process— a search/retrieval stage and a report ine
stage. During the retrieval stage, subjects search for their prior cognitive
responses in LTM via the spreading activation search process. Other brand-
related concepts in LTM are also activated during this search. All activated
concepts are then processed in STM during the thought reporting stage. Each
of these processing stages can affect one or more post-exposure dependent
measures that are of interest to persuasion researchers. We now explore the
nature of these effects.
Implications of the Spreading Activa tion Search Process
One consequence of the search for cognitive responses in LTM is that brand
name and some of the ad statements/claims that are stored in close proximity
to the cognitive responses will also be activated. These activated concepts
should be more easily retrievable in a subsequent memory task. There is evi-
dence in the verbal learning literature to show that activating a concept in
memory during an initial (unrelated) task increases the likelihood and speed
with which that concept is later recalled (e.g., Meyer and Schvaneveld 1971).
Thus, thought measurement should increase recall of brand name and ad content.
Unfortunately, ad content recall was not measured in our study, so brand name
recall data were used to test this prediction.
The search process also activates beliefs, attitudes, and intentions, and
primes the pathways or arcs connecting these concepts in LTM. This means that
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these cognitive structure variables are more strongly interconnected following
search. The increased interconnectedness or cohesiveness in cognitive struc-
ture should be reflected in two measures that are of interest to persuasion
researchers. First, the increased cohesiveness should increase the strength
of association among beliefs and attitude/intention measures. Second, the
increased cohesiveness should increase the confidence or certainty with which
beliefs, attitudes, and intentions are held in memory. Indirect support for
these predictions comes from a study by Olson and Dover (1978) in which re-
peated activations of beliefs, attitudes and intentions towards an advertised
brand lead to stronger correlations among, and greater confidence in these
variables.
In sum, we expect the spreading activation search process to mediate
thought measurement effects on three distinct dependent variables that are of
interest to (and frequently measured by) persuasion researchers. Specifically,
thought measurement should increase (a) recall of brand name, (b) strength of
association among beliefs and attitude/intention measures, and (c) confidence
in belief, attitude, and intention variables.
Moderating Influenc e of Processing Goals. The predictions we have derived
thus far are based on the assumption that audience members adopt a brand eval-
uation goal when they initially view and process the product advertisements.
However, audience members who are uninvolved with the advertised product cate-
gory may not be interested in engaging in brand evaluation processes (Mitchell
1983). Instead, uninvolved audiences may adopt one of several non-brand eval-
uation goals such as enjoying and being entertained by the advertisement
(entertainment goal) or evaluating the advertisement on its executional merits
(ad evaluation goal; see Mitchell 1979, 1980, 1983; Mitchell and Olson 1981;
Gardner, Mitchell and Russo 1985; Gardner 1985; Beattie and Mitchell 1985 for
additional discussion on processing goals). Such audiences will generate few
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(if any) cognitive responses about the advertised brand, and are not likely to
form brand-related beliefs and attitudes during the ad-viewing episode. In-
stead, audiences with an entertainment or ad evaluation goal will likely gener-
ate pro/con thoughts targeted at the advertisement itself, and develop overall
evaluations of the advertisement (i.e., attitude towards the ad). Consequently,
.the search for cognitive responses during the retrieval stage should activate
few (if any) message assertions, or belief /attitude/intention variables about
the advertised brand. Thus, thought measurement should result in weaker
effects on the recall of brand name/ad content, as well as confidence in and
strength of association among beliefs, attitude, and intention elements for
audiences who adopt a non-brand evaluation goal.
The hypothesized moderating influence of processing goals on the magnitude
of reactive effects due to thought measurement should be of interest to adver-
tising researchers and practitioners since commercial message audiences are
likely to adopt a variety of processing goals in natural viewing situations.
In our study, we manipulated processing goals at two levels— brand evaluation
and ad evaluation— to test the following related hypotheses:
HI: Brand name recall will be higher following thought measurement. Fur-
thermore, the effects due to thought measurement on brand name recall
will be stronger under a brand evaluation goal than under an ad eval-
uation goal.
H2 : Strength of association among belief and attitude/intention measures
will be higher following thought measurement. Furthermore, the
effects due to thought measurement on these strength of association
measures will be stronger under a brand evaluation goal than under an
ad evaluation goal.
H3: Confidence in belief, attitude, and intention variables will be higher
following thought measurement. Furthermore, the effects due to
thought measurement on confidence will be stronger under a brand eval-
uation goal than under an ad evaluation goal.
E 1 a
b
orative Processing of Activated Concepts During Thought Reporting;
Thus far we have made no predictions about the effects of thought measure-
ment on beliefs and attitudes about the advertised brand. Simply activating
these cognitive structure elements during search will not induce changes in
their intensity or evaluative directionality. Changes in beliefs and atti-
tudes, if they occur, must occur at the thought reporting stage. Note that
the subjects' primary task at this stage is to identify and report their pre-
viously experienced cognitive responses. However, if this thought reporting
task is not too demanding (i.e., if it does not take up most of STM processing
capacity), then subjects may also choose to additionally process and elaborate
upon some of the message assertions and beliefs/attitudes that were activated
during the search process. Such elaborative processing will result in new
cognitive responses which, in turn, will induce changes in beliefs and atti-
tudes about the brand.
Note that only if a brand evaluation goal was salient during the ad-viewinl
episode will message assertions as well as beliefs and attitudes about the
brand be activated during search and hence available in STM for elaborative
processing. However, simply because these brand-related concepts are activated
does not mean that subjects will think about and elaborate on these concepts
during the thought reporting task. For elaborative processing to occur, sub-
jects must have both the opportunity and the motivation to engage in such pro-
cessing activity. The opportunity factor will primarily depend on the amount
of time given to subjects for thought reporting. If stringent limits are
placed on reporting time, then subjects will have sufficient time to report
their previously experienced cognitive responses, but minimal opportunity for
generating new cognitive responses from scratch via elaborative processing
(Wright 1980). However, if reporting time is excessive or unconstrained, then
elaborative processing is at least a possibility. Indirect support for this
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proposition comes from research concerning the effects of thought on attitude
which suggests that simply giving subjects an opportunity to think about stim-
ulus material after exposure tends to polarize beliefs and attitudes about
that material, and increasing the time (and hence opportunity) for thought
tends to increase polarization likelihood (Tesser 1976; Tesser and Coulee
1975; Tesser and Cowan 1977; Tesser and Leone 1977; Sadler and Tesser 1973).
Subjects' motivation to elaborate will depend on factors such as previous
experiences with the advertising message and involvement with the advertised
brand. For instance, repeated exposures to an advertisement provide subjects
with multiple opportunities to process ad content and should thus result in a
detailed, well formed belief structure. A detailed belief structure can also
result from a single exposure if the. advertised brand is highly involving and
motivates subjects into detailed, elaborative processing during the ad-viewing
episode. Consequently, the need for (and hence motivation to) engage in addi-
tional thought processing during the reporting task should be quite Low. In
contrast, a single limited time exposure to an unfamiliar advertisement is
unlikely to produce a detailed and well-formed belief structure—and espe-
cially so for an uninvolving brand where sub-jects are not sufficiently moti-
vated to engage in detailed message processing. In particular, there might be
residual inconsistencies within the belief structure or between the beliefs
and attitudes/intentions. Furthermore, some of the beliefs may be based on
incomplete and/or incorrect assessment of the message claims. Thus, subjects
may be particularly motivated to engage in elaborative processes such as in-
ferring new beliefs or modifying some of the existing beliefs during a sub-
sequent thought measurement task. Changes in the belief structure would
induce a revision of attitudes and inventions as well.
Earlier, we described three studies in the social psychology literature
that failed to obtain significant effects due to thought measurement on
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subsequent measures of attitude (Petty and Cacioppo 1977; Insko , Turnbull and
Yandell 1974; Petty, Wells and Brock 1976). These findings can readily be
explained within our theoretical framework. All three of the studies used
persuasive messages on highly involving topics (e.g., tuition hike for under-
graduate students in Petty, Wells and Brock 1976). Furthermore, two of the
three studies imposed a time limit of 2V2 minutes for the thought reporting
task (Insko, Turnbull and Yandell did not report on this issue at all). Thus,
subjects likely did not have either the motivation or the opportunity to en-
gage in elaborative processing during thought measurement—thus precluding
strong measurement effects on post-attitude scores. Our framework suggests,
however, that these results will not hold in persuasion contexts where subjects
are uninvolved with the message and the amount of time given subjects for
thought listing is high or unlimited.
One goal of the present research was to examine thought measurement effects
on subsequent measures of cognitive structure using stimuli and measurement
procedures similar to those used in previous advertising studies. Most cogni-
tive response studies in the consumer behavior literature have used novel ad-
vertisements about unfamiliar and relatively uninvolving products as the exper-
imental stimuli— thus heightening subjects' motivation to engage in elaborative
processing during thought measurement. However, following the advice of
Wright (1980), consumer researchers have begun to impose stringent limits on
the amount of time given to subjects for thought listing/verbalization.
Limited thought reporting time should minimize the opportunity for elaborative
processing. Thus, we would expect relatively weak (if any) effects due to
thought measurement on subsequent measures of belief, attitude, and intention
variables. This proposition was tested in the present study:
H4: If stringent time limits are placed on the thought measurement task,
then thought measurement will not influence subsequent measures of
belief, attitude, and intention variables.
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Summary
A simple framework based on information processing theory was proposed to
examine the effects of retrospective thought measurement on subsequent measures
of cognitive structure about an advertised brand. (A flow chart representation
of the framework is displayed in Figure A.) Specifically, the retrospective
thought listing task was conceptualized as a two stage process, with each pro-
cessing stage (search/retrieval stage and reporting stage) producing effects
on different aspects of post-exposure cognitive structure. This framework was
used to develop several predictions about the dependent variables that are
likely to be effected by thought measurement, and the conditions under which
these effects are strong or weak. We now report on an experiment designed to
test some of these predictions.
METHOD
Study Overview
Subjects were exposed to print advertisements for fictitious brands (named
Banner and Sprint) of two commonly used consumer products, white bread and
ball point pen. The advertisements were created especially for this study and
had not been seen before. Immediately after exposure, subjects listed their
thoughts in response to one of the two product ads, and then provided several
measures of post-exposure cognitive structure.
Subjects and Design
One hundred and sixty-five subjects participated in the study. Of these,
160 provided usable responses. A four-way (2x2x2x2) factorial design
was employed separately for each one of the two products (n=10 per cell).
Only two of these factors
—
processing goals (brand versus ad evaluation), and
thought measurement (for the bread ad or the pen ad)—are of theoretical inter-
est. Although the other two factors— ad message quality (strong versus weak)
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and order of belief and attitude measurement (beliefs measured before attitude
or vice versa)—were retained in all analyses, these are not of interest in
the present study and hence only briefly discussed.
Processing Goals . Two levels of Processing Goals—a brand evaluation goal
and an ad evaluation goal—were created via orienting instructions. Each
study participant was given these instructions just before (s)he viewed the
print advertisements. Subjects assigned to the brand evaluation goal condi-
tion were told that the purpose of the study was to develop an understanding
of how people evaluate products based on the information in advertisements.
They were asked to examine the information in each advertisement and decide
whether they liked the advertised brand and if they would be interested in
purchasing it. Subjects assigned to the ad evaluation goal condition were
told that the purpose of the study was to develop an understanding of how
people evaluate print advertisements. They were asked to examine each adver-
tisement carefully and to decide whether they liked the ad, and if it was the
kind of ad that would attract and hold their attention.
Thought Measurement . All subjects were exposed to two experimental ads
(one each for Banner bread and Sprint pen), provided verbal reports for only
one of the two product ads, and provided measures of post-exposure cognitive
structure for both products. Thus all subjects in the "thought measurement"
condition for Banner bread also served as the "no thought measurement" con-
dition for Sprint pen, and vice versa.
Message Quality . Four color print advertisements—two each for Banner
bread and Sprint pen were created by a professional artist. All of these
advertisements had a similar layout. The upper half of the page contained a
picture of the advertised brand and a very general headline above it in bold
letters. The lower half of the page contained the persuasive arguments. For
Banner bread, the first copy statement in both versions of the advertisement
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said , "Banner is one of the most nutritious white breads on the market today.
Here's why..." Then, one version provided three relatively compelling reasons
for accepting this claim about nutritional quality (strong quality message),
whereas, the second version provided three relatively uncompelling reasons for
claim acceptance (weak quality message). Similarly, the Sprint pen advertise-
ment emphasized the properties of ink flow consistency and smooth writing with
the opening sentence, "Consistent ink floi<7 and smooth writing are what you
want from a ball point pen. " This claim was followed by either three com-
pelling or three uncompelling reasons for claim acceptance.
Order of Measurement . The order in which beliefs and attitudes/intentions
towards the advertised brand were measured was counterbalanced, and served as
a between subjects factor.
Procedure
The study was conducted in 29 experimental sessions with groups of 2-8
subjects per session. Upon arrival, subjects were given a one-page set of
orienting instructions designed to manipulate their processing goals .(Brand
versus Ad Evaluation). Then, all subjects were shown five advertisements--
the two experimental ads (strong or weak quality versions) and three "control"
ads that were similar in structure and layout as the experimental ads. These
advertisements were projected onto a screen via a slide projector for 45
seconds each. This time limit was judged appropriate based on pre-test data.
The two ads for Banner bread and Sprint pen were rotated in positions 2 and 4
of the ad-viewing sequence such that exactly half the subjects saw each ad in
each position.
After the fourth ad (or second experimental ad), the ad-viewing session
was interrupted without warning, and cognitive responses were obtained for the
fourth ad only. This ad happened to be for Banner bread for half the subjects
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and for Sprint pen for the other half. Subjects were given exactly three
minutes to list all the thoughts they had while viewing the ad. The three-
minute time limit was judged adequate based on pre-test data.
After the subjects had viewed all five ads, they completed the rest of the
study questionnaire, which was designed to measure post-exposure cognitive
structure for both experimental products. Subjects were then debriefed, paid
five dollars, and thanked for their participation.
Dependent Variables
Recall. Immediately after viewing the five advertisements, subjects
completed a 3-5 minute intervening task to clear working memory, and then
free-recalled the advertised brands.
Beli ef Strength and Attribute Evaluation Measure s. A modification of
Ahtola's (1975) procedure was used to measure belief strength and attribute
evaluation. The modification was developed by Mitchell and Olson (1981) and
is explained in detail in their paper. This approach requires that measure-
ment be done for discriminable attribute levels, rather than for the attri-
butes themselves. As an example, the attribute of nutritional quality for
white bread was partitioned into three levels—more nutritious, about as
nutritious, and less nutritious than most other white breads. Then, subjects
rated their belief strength (b..) for each attribute (i) for each level ( j ) on
a seven-point bipolar scale (not at all likely-very likely). A seven-point
scale (good-bad) was used to measure the corresponding evaluation (e..) for
2
each attribute level.
Brand Evaluation and Purchase Inten tion Measures. Multiple seven-point
scales were used to measure brand attitude (A, ) and attitude towards the actbr
of brand purchase (A ). A, was measured using three scales (good-bad, high
act br °
quality-poor quality, like-dislike), A using four scales (good-bad, beneficialdC L
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harmf ul , wise-foolish, pleasant-unpleasant). The reliability of these scales
as measured by coefficient a was greater than 0.90 for both constructs. Con-
sequently, the mean of the evaluative scales for each construct was taken as
the operational measure for that construct. Intention to purchase the brand
(BI) was measured using a single seven-point scale (not at all likely-very
likely).
Confidence Measures. Confidence in beliefs (b..) as well as A, , A , and
lj br act'
BI were all measured by seven-point scales (1 = not at all confident, 7 = very
confident)
.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation of processing goals was checked in two ways. First, we
had subjects agree or disagree (on a seven-point scale, with 7 = strongly
agree) with two statements describing how they processed the print adver-
tisements :
(1) I was mainly thinking about whether the product would be suitable
for me
.
(2) I was mainly thinking about whether or not I liked the advertisement.
As expected, subjects assigned to the brand evaluation goal agreed more
with statement 1 (Mean M = 5.86 for bread, 6.06 for pen) than did subjects
assigned to the ad evaluation goal (M = 3.09 for bread, 3.54 for pen). Con-
versely, ad evaluation goal subjects agreed more with statement 2 (M = 6.25
for bread, 6.19 for pen) than did brand evaluation goal subjects (M = 3.94 for
bread, 3.89 for pen). All differences were significant at p < .01.
As a second check, we examined the effect of Processing Goals on the num-
ber of brand versus ad-related thoughts reported by subjects. As expected,
subjects assigned to the brand evaluation goal reported more brand-related
thoughts (M = 2.55 for bread, 3.33 for pen) than did subjects assigned to the
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ad evaluation goal (M = 0.55 for bread, 0.50 for pen). Conversely, ad evalua-
tion goal subjects reported more ad-related thoughts (M = 4.40 for bread, 4.30
for pen) than did brand evaluation goal (M = 3.03 for bread, 2.33 for pen).
These results clearly suggest that the processing goals manipulation was suc-
cessful in either encouraging or distracting subjects from thinking about the
advertised brand and its properties.
Thought Measurement Effects Mediated by the Search Process
The spreading activation search process is expected to mediate effects due
to thought measurement on three persuasion-related variables—brand name
recall, strength of association among beliefs and attitude/intention measures
and confidence in beliefs and attitude/intention variables (hypotheses 1
through 3).
Brand Name Recall . Table 1 shows the number of subjects who correctly
recalled the brand names (Banner and Sprint) for the two experimental products
at different levels of the processing goals and thought measurement factors.
Note first that thought measurement consistently led to higher recall fre-
quency for both products (x = 10.32 for bread, 9.23 for pen, both p < .01).
Furthermore, thought measurement led to higher recall only under a brand eval-
2
uation goal (x = 10.77 for bread, 8.35 for pen, both p < .01), and not under
an ad evaluation goal (x
2 = i- 33 for bread, 2.52 for pen, both p > .10).
These results clearly support HI.
Strength of Association Between Beliefs and Attitude/Intention Measures .
According to H2 , thought measurement is expected to increase the strength of
association between beliefs and attitude/intention measures, and particularly
so for subjects assigned to the brand evaluation goal condition. Table 2
shows the correlations between the expectancy-value index of beliefs (EEb..e..)J ij iJ
and A,
,
A and BI scores computed • separately for the "thought measurement"
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and "no thought measurement" conditions. Each correlation is based on 80
observations. These correlations exhibit the expected pattern of results for
both products, and especially so for Banner bread where two of the correla-
tions (EEb..e.. - A and EEb..e.. - BI) were significantly higher following
ij ij act ij ij
thought measurement than the corresponding correlations in the absence of
thought measurement (see Table 2).
Table 3 also shows the correlations between the expectancy value index
(EEb..e..) and A,
,
A and BI, but these have been computed separately for
ij ij br act K 3
each of the four cells of the Thought Measurement by Processing Goals sub-
design (40 observations per cell). The pattern of correlations for Banner
bread is clearly consistent with prior expectations— thought measurement led
to significantly larger correlations for subjects with a brand evaluation
goal, but had virtually no effect on subjects with an ad evaluation goal. For
Sprint pen, thought measurement seems to have resulted in marginally larger
correlations independent of the processing goals factor. However, the dif-
ferences in these correlations were quite small and not statistically signifi-
cant (p > .10). Thus H2 is supported in the analyses for Banner bread data,
but not for the Sprint pen data analyses.
Confidence Scores . The effects of thought measurement on confidence in
belief, attitude and intention variables were examined in several four-way
ANOVA separately for the two products. Of primary interest here is the main
effect due to Thought Measurement, and the two-way interaction between Thought
Measurement and Processing Goals. Specifically, thought measurement should
increase confidence, and this effect should occur primarily for subjects with
a brand evaluation goal.
Table 4 displays the marginal means for confidence in A, , A , and BI at
br act
different levels of the thought measurement and processing goals factors.
Also, F-ratios and significance levels for the two effects of theoretical
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interest are displayed. As expected, thought measurement led to significantly
higher confidence in all three variables for both products. However, the
hypothesized two-way interaction did not reach significance for any of the
three variables for either product. Virtually none of the other interaction
effects involving the thought verbalization factor reached significance.
These results are only partially consistent with hyothesis H3.
Confidence in beliefs was measured at the discriminable belief level.
Seventeen confidence ratings were obtained for the seven salient beliefs for
Banner bread. Similarly, the eight salient Sprint pen beliefs yielded 18 con-
fidence ratings. Table 4 shows the marginal means for the average of these
belief confidence scores. As expected, average confidence in beliefs was
significantly higher following thought measurement. Furthermore, the hypothe-
sized two-way interaction also reached significance for both products— thought
measurement produced larger effects on the average confidence in beliefs under
a brand evaluation goal than under an ad evaluation goal. The analyses for
confidence in individual beliefs mimicked these results. Thought verbaliza-
tion produced at least a marginally significant (p < .10) main effect on six
of 17 confidence scores for Banner bread, and eight of 18 confidence scores
for Sprint pen. (At p < .05, the corresponding numbers were 4/17 and 7/18
respectively.) Furthermore, the hypothesized thought verbalization by pro-
cessing strategy interaction approached significance (p < .10) in five of 17
cases for Banner bread, and eight of 18 cases for Spring pen. (At p < .05,
the corresponding numbers were 3/17 and 6/18 respectively). In almost all
cases, the marginal treatment means displayed the same pattern as the average
belief confidence score (see Table 4). Very few other interaction effects
involving the thought verbalization factor reached significance, and these
were scattered and uninteresting. These results clearly support H3.
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Thought Measurement Effects Mediated by Elaborative Processing
Thought measurement can bias subsequent measures of belief structure as
well as attitudes and intentions towards the advertised brand— but only if
subjects have both the motivation and the opportunity to engage in elaborative
processing during the thought reporting stage. In the present study, subjects'
opportunity to engage in elaborative processing was severely curtailed by
limiting the amount of time they had for reporting their thoughts. Therefore,
we did not expect to find significant effects due to Thought Measurement on
subsequent belief, attitude, and intention measures (H4).
Our analyses substantiated this prediction. In separate four-way ANOVA,
thought measurement failed to produce a significant main effect on any of four
indices of brand evaluation (EEb..e.., A, . A _. BI) for either product
ij ij br act r
(p > .10 in all cases). More generally, virtually none of the main or inter-
active effects involving the thought measurement factor were significant. For
instance, only one out of 32 possible effects were significant for Banner
bread, while none of the 32 possible effects were significant for Sprint pen
at p < .05. The analyses for individual belief scores produced similar
results. Thought Measurement failed to produce significant effects on any of
the seven salient beliefs for Banner bread or for any of the eight salient
beliefs for Sprint pen (p > .05 in all cases). When all possible effects due
to the thought measurement factor were examined, only three of 56 were signif-
icant for Banner bread, and 3 of 64 were significant for Sprint pen at p < .05.
Since these results could readily be attributed to chance factors, it appears
that thought measurement did not induce any changes in post-exposure measures
of beliefs, attitudes, and intentions in the present study.
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DISCUSSION
Much has been said (and some empirical work done) concerning the reactive
effects due to retrospective thought measurement in persuasion research. How-
ever, little is currently understood about the mechanisms or mental processes
that mediate thought measurement effects on post-exposure cognitive structure,
or about the conditions under which these effects are likely to be strong. In
this paper, a simple two-stage model of the retrospective thought listing task
was proposed. Some of the predictions derived from this model were then tested
in a laboratory experiment on advertising effects. The intent was to examine
reactive effects due to thought measurement in a study utilizing stimuli and
measurement procedures similar to those typically used in advertising research
on cognitive response mediation. Overall, the results were quite consistent
with model predictions.
Summary of Findings
Our findings clearly suggest that thought measurement activates other
"related" cognitions that are stored in LTM in close proximity to the "to-be-
reported" thoughts. This proposition was supported in analyses involving
three distinct dependent variables. Thought measurement consistently lead to
(a) higher brand name recall, (b) greater confidence in belief, attitude, and
intention variables, and (c) stronger correlations between the expectancy-value
index of beliefs and attitude/intention measures (although only for one of the
two products). Thus, the spreading-activation search process appears to intro-
duce a bias in post-exposure cognitive structure by making it more intercon-
nected, more cohesive, and more easily retrievable in a subsequent memory task.
We introduced the manipulation of processing goals in an attempt to devel-
op even stronger tests of the "spreading-activation" proposition. This vari-
able was chosen because a number of persuasion and advertising researchers
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have become interested in the effects of processing goals on cognitive response
mediation processes (e.g., Mitchell 1983; Batra and Ray 1983; Gardner 1985).
The hypothesized Processing Goals by Thought Measurement interaction was sup-
ported in analyses for brand name recall, and received partial support in
analyses involving confidence scores (for beliefs, but not attitude or inten-
tions) and correlations between beliefs and attitudes/intentions (for white
bread data only). These findings provide some (but not unambiguous) support
for the expectation that reactive effects due to thought measurement are
stronger following a brand evaluation goal, than following an ad evaluation
goal.
Finally, we also examined the effects of taking thought measurements on
more traditional indicators of persuasive impact—beliefs, attitudes, and
purchase intentions about the advertised product. Our model suggests that
thought measurement will influence these variables only if subjects have both
the opportunity as well as the motivation to engage in elaborative processing
during the thought reporting stage. Given our interest in examining reactive
effects due to thought measurement under conditions similar to those obtained
in other advertising studies, we limited the opportunity for elaborative pro-
cessing by imposing a three minute time limit on the thought reporting task.
As expected, thought measurement failed to produce any detectable effects on
belief, attitude, or intention variables under these conditions.
Implications for Cognitive Response Research
Most cognitive response researchers use verbal reports as data to test
the mediating effects due to different cognitive response types (e.g.,
counterarguments and support arguments) directly on belief, attitude, and
intention variables. A few empirical studies in social psychology have shown
that retrospective thought measurements do not bias these tests of mediation
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since they do not influence post-exposure attitudinal measures. Our results
are consistent with these findings, and extend them to mediation analyses
involving attributable beliefs and behavioral intentions as well. Further-
more, since the procedures used to obtain thought measurements in our study
were very similar to those most frequently used in past cognitive response
research, we believe that our findings do address some of the concerns about
the validity of previous tests of cognitive response mediation.
More recently, however, researchers have begun to postulate more strict
causal orderings among the cognitive structure variables. For example, the
cognitive response-cognitive structure (CR-CS) model (Lutz and Swasy 1977;
Olson, Toy, and Dover 1978, 1982) posits the following causal flow:
Exposure to Cognitive Belief Formation
Advertisement Responses (or change)
Attitude Formation Behavioral _
,
, , N
> + Behavior(or change) Intentions
A test of this strict mediational chain is yet to be reported in the liter-
ature. However, taking thought measurements would likely bias such a test by
inflating the observed strength of relationship between beliefs, and attitude/
intention variables.
More generally, the increased cohesiveness and confidence in the cognitive
structure instilled by thought measurement should influence the predictive
potential of expectancy-value models of attitude and behavior. The importance
of confidence as a moderator of belief-attitude and attitude-behavior relation-
ships is increasingly being recognized. For instance, Smith and Swinyard
(1982) have proposed that exposure to advertising typically produces beliefs
that are held with a low level of confidence, and hence are only weakly predic-
tive of attitude and overt behavior. They suggest that direct experience with
the product is likely to increase the confidence in beliefs, and hence enhance
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their prediction potential. Olson and Dover (1978) have shown that even re-
peated exposure to the same advertisement can increase confidence in beliefs
(also see Dover and Olson 1977; Olson and Dover 1976). In their study, ad
repetition (1, 2, or 3 exposures) produced no effects on beliefs and attitudes,
but produced a consistent increase in the confidence in beliefs as well as in
the belief-attitude correlation. In other words, repetition changed the nature
and dynamics of the belief-attitude relationship without producing direct
effects on these variables. Olson and Dover (1978) have labeled this phenome-
non attitude maturation. Our results fit in nicely with the work by Smith and
Swinyard (1982), and Olson and Dover (1978). They suggest that attitude matur-
ation can occur even with a single exposure to an advertisement if subjects
are given an opportunity to activate and think about their brand-related cog-
nitions during a thought measurement task. Stated differently, thought measure-
ment appears to produce similar (although admittedly weaker) effects on the
cohesiveness and confidence in cognitive structure as do ad repetition and
direct product experience.
The moderating influence of processing goals on thought measurement effects
we obtained also has some important implications for cognitive response re-
searchers. In most cognitive response studies, subjects are given extremely
general orienting instructions—thus allowing them to decide for themselves as
to how they should process the commercial messages (Wright 1980). One would
expect such orienting instructions to result in considerable heterogeneity in
the processing goals that subjects adopt during the ad-viewing episode. Since
thought measurement is expected to interact with processing goals, variation in
processing goals within experimental cells will only add to the error variance,
and thus weaken tests of effects due to treatment manipulations on confidence
or belief-attitude/intention correlation measures. Interestingly, the labora-
tory context (which is almost always used in cognitive response research) may
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heighten subject's motivation levels and induce them to engage in brand eval-
uation processes. If so, then reactive effects due to thought measurement may
be particularly strong in laboratory settings.
Finally, our results also suggests that thought measurement introduces
bias in measures of brand name recall. Brand name and ad content recall are
extremely popular indicators of advertising effectiveness, and routinely
measured in copy testing research. Some cognitive response researchers have
recently begun to examine the relationship between cognitive responses and
recall. Our study shows, however, that interspersing a thought reporting task
between ad exposure and recall measurement will lead to an inflated account of
brand name (and ad content) memorability.
Future Research Directions
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to examine the effects
of thought measurement on cognitive structure in an advertising context.
Clearly, much more research is needed before we fully understand the nature
and magnitude of effects due to thought measurement, as well as the causes for
these effects. The conceptual model of the thought reporting process devel-
oped in this paper isolates some promising avenues for future research. Some
of these are explored below.
Motivation and Opportunit y to Elaborate. In our study, motivation and
opportunity to engage in elaborative processing during the thought reporting
stage were fixed at levels that commonly obtain in cognitive response studies
(high motivation, low opportunity). Future research should more systemati-
cally examine the influence of these variables on the reactive effects due to
thought measurement. The motivation factor could be varied by manipulating
the number of exposures to an advertisement prior to thought reporting, by
blocking on prior exposure to the experimental ads, or by blocking on prior
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knowledge about, and involvement with the experimental products. Opportunity
to elaborate can be varied by manipulating the amount of time available for
thought reporting. Research in this area should provide insights into the
conditions under which thought measurement is most likely to influence post-
exposure belief and attitudinal measures.
General versus Directive Instructions . In our research, we instructed
subjects to list all the thoughts they had while attending to the advertise-
ment without regard to the origin or target of these thoughts. There is con-
sensus in the literature that such "general" instructions are preferable to
instructions that direct the subject to only report certain types of thoughts—
typically thoughts targetted at the advertised brand (Wright 1980). A well
publicized problem with directive instructions is that they are likely to bias
and inflate thinking and reporting in favor of the targetted thought category.
Nevertheless, the use of directive instructions continues to be popular (Cook
1969; Osterhouse and Brock 1970; Roberts and Maccoby 1973; Petty, Wells and
Brock 1976).
Our research suggests an additional problem with directive instructions.
By requiring subjects to report only those thoughts that were targetted at the
advertised brand, the researcher is essentially encouraging activation and
elaborative processing of brand-related cognitions in memory. Thus, directive
instructions may lead to more substantial effects due to thought measurement
than were obtained in our research.
Concurrent versus Retrospective Verbalization . We would also encourage
future research on the relative effects due to concurrent versus retrospective
thought measurement on cognitive structure. One crucial difference between
the two procedures is that while retrospective measurement requires subjects
to focus attention only on the thought reporting task, concurrent measurement
requires subjects to view and process the message as well as to report their
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thoughts. This suggests that concurrent verbalization should produce even
weaker effects on cognitive structure (if at all) since very little processing
capacity is left over for elaborative processing. Empirical research on this
issue would provide valuable guidelines for persuasion researchers who are
confronted with a choice between the two methods.
Dependent Variables . We examined thought measurement effects on several
dependent variables in an attempt to generate convergent evidence for the
hypothesized activation/elaborative processing mechanisms. In retrospect, it
seems clear that several additional dependent measures could also have been
used
—
particularly to indicate the spreading-activation process. The use of
recall and recognition measures to indicate thought measurement effects would
be particularly attractive since these measures are popular among advertising
researchers and practitioners. We did show thought measurement effects on
brand name recall, but demonstrating similar effects on recall of ad content
would be even more compelling. Furthermore, increased accessibility of brand
name and ad content due to spreading activation could also be indicated
through response latencies for recognition probes. Specifically, recognition
of brand name and message assertions should be speeded up following thought
measurement because of their heightened accessibility in LTM. Thus, by using
multiple indicators (confidence scores, correlations among cognitive structure
variables, multiple recall/recognition measures, response latencies), future
research could begin to isolate and examine in detail the precise mechanisms
mediating thought measurement effects on cognitive structure.
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FOOTNOTES
Our intent was to give subjects enough time to list their prior thoughts,
but insufficient time to generate new thoughts via elaborative processing.
Following Wright's (1980) suggestion, we observed naturally occurring pauses
during the thought listing task for our pre-test subjects to determine an
appropriate time limit.
2
This procedure yielded 17 discriminable belief scores (b-ji) for the seven
salient attributes for bread, and 18 discriminable belief scores for the eight
salient attributes for pen.
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TABLE 1
EFFECT OF THOUGHT MEASUREMENT AND PROCESSING GOALS FACTORS
ON BRAND NAME RECALL FREQUENCY3
Brand Name Recall
Brand Evaluation
Goal
Ad Evaluation
Goal
No No
Thought Thought Thought Thought
Measurement Measurement Measurement Measurement
Banner Bread 33 19 24 18
Sprint Pen 36 25 27 20
Based on 40 subjects per cell.
TABLE 2
EFFECT OF THOUGHT MEASUREMENT ON CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN BELIEFS AND ATTITUDE/ INTENTION*3
Thought
•feasurement
No Thought
Measurement
Correlation of the
expectancy-value index
(lib. .e.
.
) with -
Product: White Bread
br
A
act
BI
56
57
61'
.42
.39
.43'
Product: Ball Point Pen
br
A
act
BI
59
55
62
.56
.53
,*i
These conditions (in a given row) differ at p < .10.
The correlations are based on 80 observations.
TABLE 3
EFFECT OF THOUGHT MEASUREMENT AND PROCESSING GOALS FACTORS
ON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BELIEFS AND ATTITUDE/ INTENTION13
Brand Evaluation Goal Ad Evaluation Goal
Thought No Thought Thought No Thought
Measurement Measurement Measurement Measurement
Product: White Bread
Correlation of the
expectancy-value index
(Sib. .e. .) with -
Au .72
b
,39
b
.31 .46
br
" . "
.69" .37"
.76" .50"
A .38 .40
act
BI
u u
.38 .34
A
br
A
,.
act
BI
Product
:
Ball Point Pen
67 .61 .51 .49
59 .58 .46 .47
69 .56 .55 .36
These correlations are based on 40 observations.
These correlations (in a given row) differ at p < .05.
TABLE 4
EFFECTS OF THOUGHT MEASUREMENT AND PROCESSING GOALS FACTORS
ON CONFIDENCE IN BELIEF, ATTITUDE, AND INTENTION VARIABLES
Treatme nt Means ANOVA - F-Ratio for:Brand Eval uation Goal Ad Eva luation Goal
Thought
Measurement
Thought
Measurement by
Processing
Goals
Thought
Measurement
No Thought
Measurement
Thought No Thought
Measurement Measurement
Product: Banner Bread
mfidence :
*br 5.45 5.10 5.28 4.95 2.75 a 0.01
A
act 5.68 5.08 5.50 5.18 5.74 b 0.51
BI 6.10 5.73 5.83 5.45 5.17 b 0.00
Beliefs (avg) 5.27 4.77 5.00 5.01 3.58 a 3.58a
Product: Sprint Pen
nridence
:
Sr 5.55 5.00 5.30 5.00 5.46 b 0.74
\
act 5.60 4.88 5.33 5.15 4.76 b 1.78
31 5.88 5.63 5.85 5.43 4.29 b 0.29
beliefs (,avg) 5.30 4.60 5.08 4.93 10.71C 4.32 b
160
j< .10,
b
p < .05,
c
p < .01
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